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Logistics and deep raiding

One area of the game where I think some simple code changes could improve the game is in logistics. We saw in NWOL-2 that an army could go on a long raid into enemy territory where it was cut off from its homeland and, while it would eventually be destroyed, it would take a long time and more effort than is probably historically accurate. There is also the issue of recon units, particularly LC, going out of supply almost indefinitely in ways that (I think) are not historically accurate.

Two things I've been thinking about doing:
1) The reason long-term raiding can work is because you can resupply in any city you capture, if you can either capture supplies there or raise them. This, I think, is reasonable. However, you can also procure ammunition for your entire army by capturing a single city (since ammo is assumed to be available without limit in any city) and this is pretty unrealistic, I think. Right now, any unit with a supply line automatically draws ammunition as well. I could change that so ammunition had to be tracked separately, and (more importantly) you could only build ammunition in your home nation cities. You could draw it from an allied city if your ally made it available, and you could forward it to captured cities as long as you had a supply line to your homeland (or an ally's) to do it. But if you got yourself completely cut off from your home nation and your allies, then you would be unable to raise new ammunition in cities you captured, and eventually you'd run out of ammunition and be toast. It doesn't require too much code work because mostly it involves copying existing code, not creating new code.
2) Right now, the losses for being OOS are X percent per turn, no matter how long you've been out. I could make it so that the longer you've been out, the higher the losses are. That way a unit which was out of supply for 4 or 5 turns would start taking major desertion losses and have to be brought back into supply. This too doesn't require very much code work. It would force people to bring units back into supply every so often, and in particular would prevent people from sending their LC galloping from Lille to Bayonne on a lark (as is quite possible now).
There are probably other logistics changes which could be made to increase realism as well.

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Garrison discussion from the mailing list

There has been a discussion of port garrisons and burning ships on the mailing list. John Sanders has hinted (I think using the point of his saber :) that we should move it to the web site, so I'm dropping it into this topic.

Over there, Jim Voege wrote:
> I hope that when all is said and done, our little Viking raids will have
> promoted the maintenance of realistic garrison levels. Hopefully rule
> changes won't wipe all that out.

They won't. It is well known that NWOL players do not, generally, either
maintain adequate garrisons or leave enough financial capacity in reserve to
raise additional troops in the homeland in case of a surprise. (Denmark was
guilty on all these points last game - I'm not excepting myself.) They're
welcome to do that, but there's a risk associated with it, and Holland's
result last game is what happens if you take that risk and lose.

Perhaps you should lose more VPs if you lose a home city than if you lose
a foreign city you've captured?

I am a wizard. I make things using magic. SJS

Iberia

I think Iberia had a quite large garrision in the rear areas and we tried to keep the treasury at a sufficiently high level to deal with unforseen problems.

In general there needs to be more means to make the players behave in a historical manner. I think that the national will statistic would help to accomplish this. If the national will were significantly reduced for raising too many troops and thus the income production were also reduced that would keep the country from raising troops to the max and going for broke. Same thing with alliance that do not make sense. If the players ability to prosecute a war is reduced due to making decisions that are not in the best interest of the country then that would catch up with them. When the national will starts going down a country would have to sue for peace.

Jerry Gouge

National will

My concern about national will is much the same as my concern about national goals. First, the idea requires creating a lot of specifics which are not yet in evidence. What will affect the national will of Bavaria or Denmark? Going farther with this idea will require creation of a fairly long list of items, which I cannot do myself because I do not understand the idea well enough. Second, it is essentially a way for the rules to force, or at least strongly encourage, players to play in certain ways and not others, which if done well could be a good thing, but if done less than well is bad.
Anyone want to work on producing a more detailed specification of what "national will" would entail for each nation in the game, parallel to what Nick is working on with national goals?

I am a wizard. I make things using magic. SJS

I would be willing to work on the project

I would be willing to work on the project. Basically you have to figure out a list of potential occurences that would have an impact, positively or negatively on the mood of the populous and thus a nation's ability to carry on the war. Some of these would be general and applicable across all nations and certain of them would be nation specific. The nation specific ones would require researching the topic. If we are serious about trying to do this the topic should probably move to another thread and people can submit ideas for things that would effect national will.

Example: winning a battle would effect national will in a positive manner, the bigger the battle the better and would impact the losing nation in a negative manner. Also for the given battle the number of men lost as a percentage of total national manpower would negatively impact national will, the greater the percentage lost the bigger the impact.

Losing men to being out-of-supply would likewise impact national will.

Britain allying with France would negatively impact each nation's national will.

The loss of a city would impact a nation's national will.

Perhaps there are nations that typically are allied, and if they are not that would negatively impact their national will. The Naples peons get depressed if they have to fight against the Venice peons.

Stuff like that. Help me out here folks.

Jerry Gouge

National will

My main question here is who's will are we trying to measure?

If we are talking the "Joe Sixpack" people in the countryside, then I would argue the factors are exactly the same for all states. They are (in no particular order) 1- How high are taxes. 2- How many people are you taking for the army. 3- How close is the fighting to were I live. All the political stuff doesn't really enter into it. The concept of national identity was in its most infantile stages in this period and then only in the most cosmopolitan areas. The other point is that up to the point where the peasants are in revolt, what they think about the war is largely irrelevant.

The real decision making class is represented by the actual players, so they should be able to set their own personal will. If they are frusterated by how things are turning out then they give up.

So that leaves the minor nobility and urban bourgeois as the only classes that are out of the direct control of the players yet influential enough to actually have an impact on policies. The national will rules would have to focus on what would cause these groups to get upset with the governments policies. The problem with this is that these groups are small enough to be bought off unless things are going drastically wrong.

Also, I am curious what the effect of national will would be in game terms.

-nick

Who's will

The national will, as I have always considered it, is the will of the people who are politically active. Whether your government is an autocratic monarchy or a Bourgeoisie republic there are a large number of people who have an opinion on government policy and would react accordingly. These can be described, all be it inadequately, as the agitators, those who can mobilise opinion and people against the government.

One point I do feel I should mention is why should a player have to give up if he is frustrated? That is completely unrepresentative of the period, or any period. however I suppose there is no chance of there being a political system introduced as people would not like it.

As to what they should be? I am not sure because my own designs are inherently too complicated. The effect should be a lowering/raising of income from cities and manpower reserves. Even a greater rate of desertion.

However, looking at the inside of my head, given that there is no politics and diplomacy then this would lead to a drastic snowballing effect for the winner of the first scraps and could induce a state of greater total war.

Logistics and deep raiding

I think we should first consider whether this raiding would have been successful, or have even been attempted, should the "victims" have garrisoned their territory at historical or otherwise adequate levels. For example, IIRC France maintained a garrison of about 40000 in Holland. Presumably these troops were augmented by the Dutch themselves. There is no question that if these garrison forces had been in place, no small foreign cavalry division could have caused any substantial or permanent damage as it did last game. Indeed I doubt such cavalry would have even attempted the raid.

So, there is a substantial chance that the success of these raids was primarily a function of neglectful play on the part of those who failed to maintain adequate garrisons. When I say "neglectful" I mean only with the benefit of hindsight.

In other words we may be in danger of fixing something that ain't broke. In the case of the long Swedish/Pomeranian raid for every city that Ken Felts and I attacked there was at least an equal number of places that we looked at but decided not to attack precisely because the garrison appeared too strong. The three Swiss cities, for example, fall into this category. So did the Dutch cities after we hit them the first time.

So what these raids really only represent is a mechanism by which to take advantage of under-garrisoned enemy territory. The raids will cease or be unsuccessful in the event of adequate garrisons. Therefore such raids promote the maintenance of adequate historical garrison levels. Why would we want to change that?

Specifically with regard to Steve's two points, first the ammunition bit I don't get. If you are in supply, you are in ammunition because ammunition is part of what is being supplied. Why would ammunition, but not say food or clothing, be dependent on a link to the home country? Secondly, also with respect to ammunition, our SW/PM force was OOC the entire time. We compensated by using only cavalry. None of the cavalry had batteries attached. So the ammunition thing would have had no effect. Thirdly, with respect to OOS losses, to be logical, this kind of change should not apply to cavalry. Cavalry can forage a far larger range than infantry and, more importantly, have their own, fast, organic transport so they can carry substantial reserves of food etc. without any loss of speed. The only issue then is fodder for the horses and I'm inclined to think that for most of our map the countryside adequately provides that except perhaps in winter.

In summary, to my mind these changes cannot be justified on historical or logical grounds. The only reason for making them would be to specifically reduce the effectiveness of raiding, a reduction which is questionable. If I might be permitted a medical analogy, raiding is not a disease, it is an innoculation against disease.

Jim Voege

Logistics and deep raiding

I like option 2. It is simpler.

John Vanvark

Reinforcing inbetween campaigns

These are fantastic ideas that I support. I think there should be similar discussion about units being allowed to reinforce inbetween campaigns when they are outside their own borders. I don't think they should be able to. A French unit (for example) should not be able to reinforce from 1000 to 4000 men in East Italy (neither should a Venetian unit in Switzerland for that matter) for a number of reasons.

Reinforcement

I think that perhaps reinforcement should be handled like supply. A unit within the nation's boundaries can be reinforced up to its maximum size limit if the manpower is available. However, a nation's units that are outside its nation's borders should receive reinforcements via transfer, either by a mechanism that allows transfer like we currently transfer supplies or via transfer by marching or shipping a topped off unit to the understrength unit and a transfer being made.

Jerry Gouge

Reinforcing

The way to reinforce a unit would be to return the unit first to its home country, then add the new men, then ship them back out. Alternatively - reserve men could be simply be shipped out directly to the unit located outside their own borders to reinforce the unit.
Therefore I do not see that reinforcement should not be allowed, however, I would suggest that the cost simply be higher due to shipping costs (as we know, TR units are costly).
I suggest a 50% cost increase to cover the costs of shipping the reserve men to brigades located outside their own borders (not sure if 50% is the correct penalty).

John Vanvark

Reinforcements debate cont.

John,
Here is my one big problem with the whole reinforcement issue. How are reinforcements just assumed to be automatically shipped from one side of Europe and back to the other just like that inbetween two war campaigns? Actual units have to make the march across one hex at a time. Why would these reinforcements be zipped through just like that? It is at least somewhat palatable for me if this happens to a unit within it's own borders, where the possibility for recruiting fellow citizens is at least feasible, or during a peace campaign.

I am wondering if there is an actual "NWOL Calender" break between when Turn 15 of one campaign ends and Turn 1 for the next campaign begins? I had always assumed there was not, and if I am correct, I do not think it can be assumed that "reinforcing" per your model could happen. There would never be time. Instead, reinforcements for a French unit in Venice, for instance, would have to come from Venice (pretty unrealistic) and would definitely never be of a similar quality as a French unit.

Reply to comment below.

How are reinforcements just assumed to be automatically shipped from one side of Europe and back to the other just like that inbetween two war campaigns?

I understand what you are saying, but let us look at another hypothetical way of doing this.
Lets say your French IN unit is in middle of Austria in T8 and is down to 3000 men. You build a new 1500 man IN in Lille lets say, and start marching it to Austria. When you get there in T1 of the beginning of the next campaign, you MERGE the two units into one. Between T8 and T1, you have lost some men bringing combined number down to 4000 men. This is technically possible I believe but requires considerable planing and headache.
Notice my overbuild of 1500 to allow for some OOS issues etc. Also, there is the extra cost of maintaining the unit for 7 turns as it marches.
The T1 reinforcement with a % penalty would simulate what I just did above, with a lot less work.

Perhaps the cost penalty I suggest should be based on the number of Strategic Squares that you are away from France (in this case). Something like 2% per Strategic Square.

John Vanvark

Headache is good

Wars are won on logistics. Those who cannot manage logisitics lose. Your example makes the reinforcement happen at a cost and this is good. However what it does not remedy is the materialization of new troops on the front as soon as one turn after losing a battle at the front. Troops should not arrive instantaneously based upon need but require advance planning.

In the real war if an army loses a battle they cannot call someone and say send me troops the next day. What hast to happen is a period of recruitment and training once the need is realized or advanced planning in anticipation of the need.

Jerry Gouge

Headache is good reply

I am in complete agreement with Jerry on this. Is there a way this could be realized with minimal intrusion on the game system? I think that is going to be the key with any minor misc. change that is made.

Current reinforcement

I agree that the current method of reinforcement between back to back war seasons is unrealistic. Perhaps the current method would be okay for a peace turn. However, realistically if it costs X supply and Y time for a unit to march from France to the Russian border during war turns it should take roughly the same time and cost the same to get the reinforcements there. An earlier reply discusses a potential remedy.

Jerry Gouge

Reinforcements debate cont.

I think much of this discussion is premised on modern notions of nationalism and national loyalty. With very limited exceptions I don't think these pertain to a game in our era. The Prussian army, for example, contained just about every nationality in the book and they didn't all enlist in Prussia. A single example -- a guy by the name of Blucher was a Pomeranian. As the game shows, at this time Pomerania was a Swedish colony on the south shore of the Baltic. Blucher was recruited into the *Swedish* Army (not the Pomeranian). He was captured fighting the Prussians. But in perhaps one of the first reported cases of the "Stockholm Syndrome" he took to his captors so much that he switched sides and was commissioned into the Prussian army! This of course is the same Blucher who at the head of the Prussian army became Napoleon's arch-nemesis and who came to Wellington's rescue at Waterloo.

So I don't have a problem with reinforcements being recruited locally outside a unit's home state. I believe that is quite historical.

As for reinforcements only being available on the first turn of a campaign, I believe that is a simple administrative convenience largely necessitated by the need to ensure that reinforcements plus return of stragglers don't take us over the unit maximums. However, in truth what these reinforcements represent is a more or less constant stream of new recruits being added throughout a campaign. So they don't take a single turn to get to their new units. In many cases they have already been travelling, notionally, for several turns.

Jim Voege

Reinforcements

Jim,

My knowledge of this era is really limited, but my one thought about the whole Blucher thing would be:
If he is Pomeranian and fighting for the Sweden, I think he is much more willing to switch to the Prussians than if he had been fighting for a Pomerania explicitly. Maybe he felt more kinship with his fellow Germanic Prussians instead of the Swedes who were "ruling" his Pomerania at the time. I have nothing to base this on, just my on supposition.

Beyond the time-frame argument, the situation I am detailing is slightly different in my mind. How can a unit that is OOS and OOC and far away from it's home territory or any friendly troops be expected to have some sort of steady invisible pipeline or local stream of available recruits pouring in. Where are they coming from, and how are they being supplied and trained? They are OOS and OOC, so they would have to come from the surrounding area (which they are simultaneously beseiging). If they forced locals to fight, their unit quality should go down. I think this rule just gives these stray units way to much freedom to refresh with manpower and also supply.

Perhaps a simple rule that a unit outside it's own national borders has to be in supply and in communication on the last turn of the campaign to be able to receive reinforcements inbetween campaigns would help.

Reinforcements outside one's nation

I can see an army attempting to recruit outside it's country. Perhaps if there was a territory beligerency score a unit could attempt to recruit soldiers where they are. Depending on the score they would get a percentage of the men they were attempting to recruit. They could also pay money to modify the recruit (bounties). Also the men would have to be present (now that means in the city). And the quality of the recruiting unit would be modified by the ratio of the men recruited using the local quality rating adjusted by the beligerency score.

Jerry Gouge