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In this article, we will examine the evolution of the "doctrine" of point defense in CWOL. This lesson will address its primary use, the defense of cities or operational logistics locations.
While there is no official doctrine in the tactics and operations used in CWOL, there are many lessons learned from the campaigns executed in CWOL 1 (1997) and CWOL 2 (1998). This article will attempt to capture some of these lessons and explain how the now-standard point defense of cities {also known as the "four corners" or the "diamond" defense) and its complimenting operational concept, the "three tier" defense, evolved.
In this article you will review:
In the initial iteration of CWOL, CWOL 1 played the autumn of 1997 to the spring of 1998, the starting strategies of both sides were offensive oriented. While this reflects the machismo of CWOL participants and proved to be very gratifying in the short term, the long term consequence of this strategem to the South paralleled the actual conflict. By 1863, in game terms, the large battalions of the Union plus some opportune operational level developments (for the Union) led to a borderline breakthrough {almost of 20th century magnitude} at the Southern interior flank in West Virginia. Shown below at figure 1, the situation in the Upper Sheandoah Valley and central North Carolina had deteriorated beyond the point where a single army commander could control it.
The answer was a twofold solution.
What resulted was the first implementation of the "3-tiered" concept and widespread use of the "diamond" defense. As CWOL 1 progressed, both sides became more efficient in the use of each concept. These lessons were built upon in CWOL 2 such that defense was the dominant doctrine in that iteration of the game. However, there have been significant rule changes made for CWOL 3 to break this pattern. This will be addressed in more detail below.
Below is the screen shot of the opening positions to the old (pre-CWOL 7)War College Command Course. This course is designed to let players at the grand tactical level, division and corps, execute a standard CWOL defense or offense scenario. The tactical situation for this exercise is a variant of the old (SAS game system) War College Common Training Scenario. The general background of the situation is:
In the operational context of the scenario, the Russians have won the approach march "battle" by rapidly moving into central and western Washington state and occupying the key towns of Olympia and Pullayup. Having achieved their immediate strategic goals, the Russians have shifted to a operational defensive posture and have massed forces to retain control of the supply base at Olympia. The Free State is currently deploying forces to contest control of Olympia.
In the beginning of CWOL, there were no "fog of war" (FOW) measures in the simulation. The only FOW that ever occurred was the fault of player misinterpretation of enemy movement or temporary lapses where a mid-level commander would lose his understanding of events. The "luxury" of the old perfect intelligence rules were many times as detrimental as they were beneficial. This occurred because players did not see a need to analyze the situation and chose to flow along with events rather than try to influence them. This "laisse faire" approach to command resulted in the raid of Richmond, the CSA capitol, in the 1861 during CWOL 2 and the fall of Montgomery AL, the CSA capitol, in CWOL 1.
Below is an example of what the defensive commander and his staff should be doing as they prepare to defend Olympia.
The Russian commander and staff are defining the possible options that the Free State forces have available to them. With that set of assumptions established, the commander can evaluate how to counter each option and what type of augmentation from Port Townsend he might need.
The mission of the three "tiers"
are different but complimentary to the overall goal of defeating
the enemy'a approach and assault. The main concept to remember
is - defeat the enemy before they gain entry to the city !
The tasks that each of the tiers contribute to this goal are:
It will be the role of your national Inspector
General to train the brigade and division commanders in whichever
technique that will be the standard procedure for your army.
The one common trait that each of these techniques have is the
use of an approximate division-sized force (8-14 regiments /
batteries) to defend a junction hex. This is a significant investment
of troops and time. The overall tactical commander of the city
defense must be certain that the battle for this "outworks"
square is critical to defeating the enemy assault on the
city's defenses.
That said, the design of the three tier system is to force the
attacker to fight the decisive tactical battle of his assault
in the "outworks". The defender, to accomplish
this purpose, must:
Concurrently, the defender must endeavor to detect, isolate, and destroy /or capture the enemy's supply trains. The combined effect of isolating the enemy's assault force in the "outworks" plus the disruption of his supply trains guarantees victory.
However, the junction hex of the
main works is occupied at all times ! Never assume
security of the main works just because of control of
all outworks and/or pickets.
5. Scenario Update:
the Attackers' Maneuver
In the graphic below, the attacker has maneuvered along the north approach (approach #2) into the picket line. The Russian commander, not having any mounted cavalry forces of consequence, has opted to use his picket line defensively to force a deployment of the attacker's advance guard and positioning of his main body (and suspected supply trains) to follow this spearhead.
After forcing the attacker to slow his movement and deploy a superior force against the picket line, the Russian commander withdraws his forces into the outworks.
6. The "Offensive-Defense"
Baron Andre' Jomini (see Military Theory of the ACW Era), one of the leading military theorists of the 19th century, was a strong influence on military thought of the ACW period. He abhorred static defense and the surender of initiative to the enemy. The popular solution, during the ACW, to the paradox of lacking a plan to achieve success offensively but no wanting to appear static was the "offensive-defense". While not used by the leading commanders of the era, Lee, Grant, Sherman, Jackson, this concept was quite popular.
The "offensive-defense", is tenuously based on a excerpt from Jomini's Art of War:
While this is indeed a very good approach
to executing a successful defense, players of CWOL should not
try to use this quote as an excuse to give away the operational
initiative {much like Leonidas Polk did in the 1862 Kentucky
campaign}. Within the context of the three tier system, the offensive-defense
means anticipating the attacker's course of action and using
it against him. In the example below, the Russian commander has
weighted the outworks such that the southern approach
into Olympia is more heavily defended. By doing so, the defender
encourages the attacker to pursue the northern, more lightly
defended approach, where the attacker will be more isolated from
supplies and reinforcements if he encurs problems.
By making the northern approach more accesible, the defender now can construct a plan to counter the attacker's most probable action(s). In the example above, the Russian commander has considered a counter plan to an attack north of the attacker's position and one against the south outworks. Given time available, a defender should plan against all possibilities. However, given limited time, the defender will construct his actions against the most probable enemy action(s) first.
Given the attacker's decision to attack north of his toehold in the picket line, the Russian commander has constrcted a plan that maximizes his advantages. The initial action by the defender will be to use its interior lines of comunication to move reinforcements into the outworks to raise its defensive posture to parity with the Free State forces. This force will pin or "fix" the attacking force in the outworks. Concurrently, under the cover of the "fog of war" rules, the defender will move his best formations to attack the detected supply train of the attacking force. This will be a very rapid and efficient operation as the Russian formation wants to penetrate the square, capture the trains, and exit before the Free State commander can respond. Not only does this action limit the atacker's capability due to logistics but also places a superior Russian force at a position where it could reinforce the outworks being contested, revert to reserve, or seek to engage any Free State reserves in proximity to the main battle to deny the attacker the flexibility of having uncommitted forces.
The example shown above emphasizes the strengths of the "3T" system. The Russian defender has used:
to maximize the results of this battle. The posture of his outworks has shaped the battle to his plan and allowed him to use his strengths.
Lastly, the Russian has used good economy of force by not over-comitting forces into the outworks battle so that he could best utilize his force to accomplish two concurrent actvities.
The defender was able to do this by using
"8-15 rule". This rule is simply that in CWOL most
battles are fought by no more than 8 to 15 regiments or batteries
because of terrain restrictions or limitations of dispositions
around the junction hex. Deployment and use a force greater
than 15 regiments for a tactical defense is wasteful and will
lead to a dispersion of combat power.
7. Hard Lessons.
The greatest tactical challenge that faces the defender using any grand tactical maneuver other than "die in place" is the fighting withdrawal. There have only been a couple of successful applications in the three year history of CWOL or its associated beta tests. Players must apply a "feel" for the flow of the battle and make their extraction while possible. The SAS rules for strategic movement are not greatly different than the old BLADD system. The player must know when his separation and "stand off" from enemy fires is sufficient for extraction and not try to get "the last lick in." The cardinal rule is: if you can shoot them, they can shoot you, and they probably will ...
Players must plan for the eventuality of a withdrawal from any defensive position. {in certain plans, it is guaranteed} To execute the withdrawal of a division or brigade, there should be a rear guard, main body, artillery support, and egress point. The rear guard, supported from a distance by the artillery, fixes the enemy formation(s) (which will outnumber the rear guard - usually 1:3 if planned correctly). The egress point {which is an adjacent square controlled by occupation of the junction hex by a friendly unit} is secured. The main body uses the separation distance provided by the rear guard to withdraw. Next, the artllery support of the rear guard withdraws. {this is the point most "good" withdrawals break down}. Last comes the rear guard, usually in echelons as half withdraws then the second half (if all can leave in one maneuver, then do it). Be prepared for failure if the last units to leave are nor able to extricate themselves. {this is the fatal sign that the withdrawal started too late} The best that can be done here is to limit the loss and continue your maneuver.
In the rule changes for CWOL 3 is a fairly robust logistics package for SAS and GQ. The impact on defensive tactics is fairly good. With the advent of the Ordnance Train and the play of the commissary in the use of the Rations Train, the defender now has an inhibitor of attacking formations that did not exist in CWOL 1 & CWOL 2. The attacker must now have a plan to focus his combat power and achieve his objective in the time alloted for the "life" of his supply base. The previous "seige" operations of sucessful defenses will be the exception, not the rule. Additionally, the existence of these Quartermaster formations gives the defender something to target with his counterattacks.
The conduct of the defense also relies on the correct use of units and veteran formations. The establishment of the fatigue rule for SAS means that that veteran formations can not be {literally} worked to death. To maintain forces on the line will take a system of reserves and replenishment not used before in CWOL. Reserves will have to be selected prior to the start of operations and their use planned out so that the battles in the outworks do not consume your units. A defense without a reserve is helpless.
The entire CWOL game engine centers
around email and the efficient use of it in comunication. This
is very evident in the defense. Each commander down to the brigade
level most know his mission and the intended purpose of his units
in the grand tactical scheme. In the first example of the Three
Tier defense performed at Raleigh NC, it failed because a brigade
commander did not understand his orders and vacated the junction
hex in an outworks square. As a consequence, the Main
Works were invested by the Union in strength before the hedgehog
defense was set and the city was lost. It all ocurred because
a division commander assumed a base level of understanding by
an attached Brigadier from state troops. Always make sure you
understand the plan - 2 levels up, & 2 levels down
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Any comments, questions or suggestions about the War College can be sent to Curator, HOLF War College
